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ABSTRACT 
We study the effect of social distancing, food vulnerability, welfare and labour COVID-
19 policy responses on riots, violence against civilians and food-related conflicts. Our 
analysis uses georeferenced data for 24 African countries with monthly local prices and 
real-time conflict data reported in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED) from January 2015 until early May 2020. Lockdowns and recent welfare 
policies have been implemented in light of COVID-19, but in some contexts also likely 
in response to ongoing conflicts. To mitigate the potential risk of endogeneity, we use 
instrumental variables. We exploit the exogeneity of global commodity prices, and 
three variables that increase the risk of COVID-19 and efficiency in response such as 
countries colonial heritage, male mortality rate attributed to air pollution and prevalence 
of diabetes in adults. We find that the probability of experiencing riots, violence against 
civilians, food-related conflicts and food looting has increased since lockdowns. Food 
vulnerability has been a contributing factor. A 10% increase in the local price index is 
associated with an increase of 0.7 percentage points in violence against civilians.  
Nonetheless, for every additional anti-poverty measure implemented in response to 
COVID-19 the probability of experiencing violence against civilians, riots and food-
related conflicts declines by approximately 0.2 percentage points.  These anti-poverty 
measures also reduce the number of fatalities associated with these conflicts. Overall, 
our findings reveal that food vulnerability has increased conflict risks, but also offer an 
optimistic view of the importance of the state in providing an extensive welfare safety 
net. 
Keywords: Riots, violence against civilians, food-related conflict, food insecurity, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, several governments have implemented social 
distancing measures. Although these measures have shown to be effective in curbing 
the spread of the novel-coronavirus, they have also shown to cause significant 
economic, social and political disruption (Barrett, 2020; Senghore, Savi, Gnangnon, 
Hanage, & Okeke, 2020). This is particularly the case for the developing world, which 
relies largely on the informal economy, still has high levels of poverty, with weak health 
and welfare systems, and where the majority of the population simply do not have the 
luxury to work remotely. For instance, in Africa, right before the pandemic outbreak, 
one in every five people was suffering from severe food insecurity, affecting nearly 277 
million people. These vulnerable people had run out of food, most likely experienced 
hunger, even gone for days without eating, putting their well-being at a great danger 
(FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, & WHO, 2019). As a result of the pandemic, several 
forecasts predict that between 60-240 million people worldwide could be pushed into 
poverty, depending on the efficiency in providing urgent and adequate relief to 
vulnerable citizens and struggling businesses  (Ahamed & Gutiérrez-Romero, 2020; 
Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). The sudden loss of jobs and livelihoods for 
millions of people have caused food shortages and inflation, an explosive combination 
for uprisings.  
This paper analyses two key questions. First, to what extent are social distancing 
measures, lockdowns and food vulnerability fuelling conflicts. Second, whether 
recently implemented COVID-19 anti-poverty programmes could curb such conflicts. 
We focus on the 24 African countries for which we have monthly data on local prices 
and real-time conflict data reported in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project (ACLED).1 We analyse four types of conflicts likely to arise as a result of 
COVID-19: riots, violence against civilians, food-related conflicts and food looting. 
We focus on these events from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020. We combine ACLED 
with the exact dates of early social distancing and lockdowns. To assess the role of food 
vulnerability and conflict, we construct a monthly index of local prices based on data 
from the Global Food Prices Database (WFP) and the USAID FEWS-NET.  These 
 
1
 ACLED provides real-time georeferenced data (with latitude and longitude 
coordinates) on the number of conflicts, associated fatalities, actors involved and exact 
date, including day and month of conflict (C. Raleigh & Dowd, 2016).  
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datasets provide monthly commodity prices at a sub-country level, across 990 local 
markets, in 24 African countries for the entire period analysed here. We also construct 
an index of welfare and labour COVID-19 policy response based on the 12 types of 
interventions (such as cash-based transfers, utility support and  wage subsidy), gathered 
by (Gentilini, Almenfi, Dale, Demarco, & Santos, 2020). We take the date of 
implementation of these measures from  Hale et al. (2020). We add a wide-range of 
georeferenced controls at the sub-country level for areas of approximately 55x55 km 
including nightlight, mobile phone coverage of 2G-3G, percentage of mountains, the 
existence of petroleum fields, mines, diamond mines, size of the area, electricity 
coverage, primary roads coverage,  population, infant mortality rate and cultivated land.   
The man-imposed mobility restrictions to curb the COVID-19 pandemic add an 
extra layer of complexity to ongoing conflicts and food vulnerability. COVID-19 
interventions (social distancing, welfare and labour policies) have been strongly 
dependent on political, economic and social contexts, thus, they are unlikely to be 
exogenous to existing conflicts. To mitigate potential endogeneity concerns, we use 
instrumental variables.  As instruments we use the male mortality rate attributed to 
household and ambient air pollution for the year 2016 and the percentage of diabetes 
prevalence among the adult population (aged 20 -79) over the years 2010-2019. Both 
instruments are known risk factors to COVID-19 mortality (Fattorini & Regoli, 2020; 
Hussain, Bhowmik, & do Vale Moreira, 2020), and are thus likely to influence the 
decision of the state as when to impose social distancing measures. We also use the 
IMF global commodity monthly price index as a proxy for exogenous economic shocks. 
We also consider as instrument the colonial heritage of the analysed countries, as 
colonial history is known to affect the quality of existing institutions (Nash & Patel, 
2019).  
The paper offers four key findings. First, there is no evidence that early social 
distancing measures, such as banning some international flights, fuelled conflicts. 
However, despite the global call for ceasefire during the pandemic, local lockdowns 
have increased the probability of countries experiencing riots, violence against civilians 
and food-related conflicts. Second, we find that a 10% increase in the local price index 
is associated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in violence against civilians.  This 
violence is more likely to occur in areas with cultivated land, in agreement with the 
theoretical literature that suggests that when food supply declines these areas are more 
vulnerable to rebel groups seeking resource appropriation, such as food 
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(Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis, & Thies, 2020).  Third, we find that the urgent welfare and 
labour anti-poverty initiatives implemented in light of COVID-19 have contributed to 
reducing the conflicts analysed. For instance, for every additional anti-poverty measure 
(nearly a 0.1 increase in the welfare/labour COVID-19 index), the probability of 
experiencing violence against civilians, riots and food-related conflicts declines by 
approximately 0.2 percentage points. These anti-poverty measures also reduce the 
number of fatalities associated with these conflicts. Fourth, we also analysed the 
number of conflicts in which the state was directly involved as an actor (either 
instigating or responding to contain violence) and distinguish between food related and 
violence against civilians. We find that in countries that have provided a higher number 
of welfare and labour anti-poverty policies, the state is less likely to be involved as an 
actor in food-related conflicts. Paradoxically, in these countries the state is more likely 
to be involved as an actor in violence against civilians, but the evidence suggests this is 
an attempt to strictly enforce local lockdowns.  
 There is scant but growing literature on the relationship between aid, anti-
poverty projects and conflict (E. Berman, Shapiro, & Felter, 2011; Crost, Felter, & 
Johnston, 2014; Nunn & Qian, 2014). The literature has offered quite mixed findings 
and is far from reaching a consensus. Nonetheless, there is more promising evidence 
that cash transfers are successful in reducing food vulnerability and poverty in the 
Africa context (Chakrabarti, Handa, Natali, Seidenfeld, & Tembo, 2020). There is also 
evidence that (conditional) cash transfers can reduce the incidence of violent conflicts 
if adequately tailored to local contexts (Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2016; Pena, Urrego, 
& Villa, 2017). Our results resonate with these encouraging findings on conflict 
reduction.  
A wide range of anti-poverty policies has been implemented (with at least five 
simultaneous and ongoing anti-poverty COVID-19 initiatives in the most active 
countries analysed here). Thus, it is not possible to disentangle in our analysis which 
specific action (if cash transfers, relief for utility bills, extended pension benefits, etc.) 
has been the one most likely to have reduced conflict. We nonetheless can ascertain that 
from the 24 analysed countries with COVID-19 welfare and labour policies, roughly 
70% have implemented cash-transfers and 30% provided relief in paying utility bills. 
Also, the countries with a broader net of COVID-19 economic support, with more 
initiatives, are reducing the most the probability of experiencing conflicts and 
associated fatalities. 
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 Our results also resonate with the earlier literature on food vulnerability, proxied 
by changes in local prices, and conflict (Brück & d’Errico, 2019; Jones, Mattiacci, & 
Braumoeller, 2017; Rezaeedaryakenari et al., 2020). The vast majority of food 
consumed in Africa (90%) comes from domestic producers (Clionad Raleigh, Choi, & 
Kniveton, 2015). Theoretically, one could argue that rises in local prices might benefit 
local producers. In reality, most producers in Africa are net consumers of food, which 
explains why increases in food prices can severely fuel conflicts. Thus, overall our 
findings highlight the importance of providing urgent welfare and labour assistance to 
curb conflicts. 
 The paper continues as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. 
We do not attempt to provide a discussion of the extensive literature on conflict, which 
can be found in detailed reviews (e.g. Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Collier & Hoeffler, 
2014). Instead, we provide a summary of the conflict studies with relevance for 
COVID-19. Section 3 describes our data and instruments. Section 4 describes the 
econometric method used. Section 5 shows the results. Section 6 presents our 
conclusions. 
 
2. LOCKDOWNS, PRICE VOLATILITY AND COVID-19 ASSISTANCE 
For millions of people, the immediate concern is not the actual novel coronavirus itself, 
but surviving the economic hardship imposed by the lockdowns. Theoretically, there 
are at least three critical mechanisms by which lockdowns could fuel violent conflicts, 
despite the restrictions on population mobility. We describe these three important 
mechanisms (lockdowns, food vulnerability and welfare assistance) next. 
 
2.1 Early social distancing measures and stricter lockdowns 
Since the lockdowns, around the world some violent and non-violent crimes and 
conflicts have declined substantially.2 However, in some countries, other conflicts have 
increased as the lockdowns intensified, such as riots and violence against civilians. Two 
key aspects could explain the rise in these conflicts. First, the existence of ongoing 
 
2
 For instance, robbery and assault have plunged in Latin America, USA and European 
cities as the lockdowns limited population mobility and ease the job of the police in 
spotting and arresting suspects. Nonetheless domestic violence has risen, as well as 
cybercrimes (The Economist, 2020). 
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conflicts. Second, the way in which lockdowns have been enforced (with or without a 
safety net). 
To address areas with pre-existing conflicts, the United Nations, on 23 March 
2020, called for an immediate global ceasefire to allow medical personnel to reach the 
vulnerable population in these areas (UN News, 2020). The plea for a ceasefire has 
nonetheless been largely ignored. According to ACLED (2020) out of the 43 countries 
with at least 50 events of organised violence before lockdowns, only ten experienced 
unilateral ceasefire, another 31 countries experienced an increase in the rates of 
organised violence, such as Mexico, Iraq, Mozambique and Syria.3  
Other conflicts emerged  soon after lockdowns over food shortages such as in 
Lesotho, South Africa, Zimbabwe as citizens who suddenly lost their livelihoods 
desperately tried to get access to food parcels handed out by authorities (J. Burke, 
2020). As governments face riots and revolts over food shortages and pleas for urgent 
assistance, there is a significant risk of using excessive force against civilians in the 
forms of military or police that could increase even further grievances and unrest. Even 
in countries without food riots or food lootings, governments risk using excessive force 
against civilians to enforce lockdowns.  
 
2.2 Food vulnerability 
Millions of people in Africa were already struggling to have enough to eat due to 
ongoing armed conflicts, extreme weather and long-historical institutional failures. 
However, this man-made imposed mobility restrictions to curb the COVID-19 
pandemic add an extra layer of complexity. Perhaps one of the significant concerns of 
lockdowns is its effect on food vulnerability. Lockdowns have imposed tight mobility 
restrictions to farmers that have hampered efforts in delivering essential food and basic 
stables in at least 33 of Africa’s 54 countries (Mutsaka, 2020). Although the pandemic 
has not disrupted the harvest per se, there are media reports of farmers in Africa with 
rotting crops as lorries have failed to arrive due to lockdown restrictions (Barrett, 2020; 
 
3
 The abysmal response is perhaps not surprising. Ceasefires have slim chances of 
working in deeply entrenched conflicts, and in many instances, violence returns with a 
vengeance soon after (P. Burke, 2016). Although having a history of failed agreements 
surprisingly can lead to negotiating a ceasefire eventually, it is first required to have a 
record of failed attempts (Joshi & Quinn, 2015) that can only be built over time. 
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George, 2020). These lockdowns have also shut down many informal food markets 
where people earn their daily living, leaving large segments of the population without 
necessary provisions, and with real prospects of having not enough to eat. Moreover, 
school closures will also imply that nearly 370 million children worldwide risk missing 
out on school meals provided by the World Food Programme (WFM, 2020).  
 Major food supply chains have been a catalytic feature of many historical 
conflicts ranging from the French Revolution until the violent unrest that eventually led 
to the Arab Spring (Barrett, 2020). As such, there is an extensive literature detailing 
how sudden food insecurity leads directly or indirectly to violent riots and social unrest 
(Brück & d’Errico, 2019; Jones et al., 2017; Clionad Raleigh et al., 2015; 
Rezaeedaryakenari et al., 2020). According to this literature, there are at least three 
critical channels through which food vulnerability increases riots and violence against 
civilians.  
First, at the individual level, food vulnerability deprives people from the most 
basic human right, enhances grievances and highlights differences in food entitlements, 
among those who can afford the luxury of food stuck for weeks and those who cannot 
even afford a meal a day (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013; Jones et al., 2017). Survival 
instincts and grievances reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violent riots against 
government, food looting and even joining rebel groups recruiting people in exchange 
for food and economic support during quarantines. Similar exchanges of food and 
“COVID-19 support packages” have been seen in Italy and Mexico with mafias and 
drug cartels, which are highly unlikely to be given without any form of expected 
reciprocity (Tondo, 2020). The literature has also reported such rebel and organised 
crime tactics in connection to food vulnerability and conflict in Africa (Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2008). Rises in local food prices are a good proxy for food shortages and 
food vulnerability. Although theoretically, producers could benefit from an increase in 
prices, in the African context, most producers are net consumers of food, hence rises in 
local and international prices make producers worse off given the higher net cost of the 
food basket (Lee & Ndulo, 2011).4  
 
4
 This negative effect is the case for most African states since they are neither major 
importers nor exporters  (Clionad Raleigh et al., 2015). Similarly, an increase in local 
prices worsens food insecurity of consumers by reducing their ability to procure 
essential food to survive (Jones et al., 2017). 
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Second, at the rebels group level, food vulnerabilities also have a direct impact 
on the group ability to mobilise resources to support activities. Some rebel groups might 
have also lost substantial revenues from the sudden drop in prices of natural resources 
which they might have illegal access to such as oil. With such falls in profits, rebel 
groups have higher incentives to victimise ordinary citizens seeking resource 
appropriation, such as food. The areas with the largest share of cultivation are most 
susceptible to such rebel tactics, particularly during food shortages (Rezaeedaryakenari 
et al., 2020).   
Third, at the national level, the government has a crucial role to play in dealing 
with food vulnerability and food-related conflicts. Governments might have different 
tolerance for food-related conflicts driven by ordinary citizens desperate for survival or 
if driven by rebel groups (Rezaeedaryakenari et al., 2020). Nonetheless, governments 
might use excessive violence against civilians to prevent further violent clashes and 
enforce strict lockdowns, depending on its ability to both provide adequate and urgent 
humanitarian support to struggling families during quarantines, and manage tactfully 
potential unrests.  
 
2.3 COVID-19 welfare and labour assistance 
Sudden lockdowns imposed without any safety net in place to help vulnerable 
populations risks pushing millions of people into extreme poverty and are likely to fuel 
conflicts.  Developing countries are particularly constrained given the recent 
devaluation of many of their currencies, plummeting oil prices, and the collapse of 
major economic sectors.  Despite this dark economic scenario, over 159 countries have 
implemented urgent welfare assistance and labour policies to deal with COVID-19 
(Gentilini et al., 2020). The extent to which these packages manage to restrain 
significant increases in poverty and conflict will depend on their outreach. That is 
whether the extended COVID-19 welfare net can support households in difficult-to-
reach rural areas, entrenched in conflicts.  
From the vast literature on conflict, we know a great deal about how economic 
crises and shocks increase civil conflicts, riots and violence against civilians (Blattman 
& Miguel, 2010; Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004). Related literature offers mixed 
evidence on the extent to which foreign aid and foreign food aid can reduce the 
incidence of conflicts. Various studies have found that aid can reduce conflicts as it 
increases popular support for governments and increases the cost of opportunity of 
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joining rebel and insurgent groups (E. Berman et al., 2011; de Ree & Nillesen, 2009; 
Nielsen, Findley, Davis, Candland, & Nielson, 2011). However, other studies have also 
found that (food) aid can increase both the incidence and the duration of civil conflicts 
(Nunn & Qian, 2014). Anti-poverty transfers such as community-driven programmes 
and food aid supplies have also been found to increase the intensity of conflicts (Crost 
et al., 2014) as insurgent groups sabotage these programmes to prevent weakening their 
ability to recruit future members.5 A similar positive association has been found 
between increased conflict and rural employment programmes (Khanna & 
Zimmermann, 2014).    
A small but growing strand of the literature has also studied the link between 
conditional cash transfers and conflict. The evidence is again somehow mixed. Some 
countries with deeply entrenched conflicts have ongoing conditional cash transfers 
without showing any direct link, such as the case of Mexico (Gutiérrez-Romero & 
Oviedo, 2018). Nonetheless, conditional cash transfers designed with the implicit aim 
of dismantling guerrilla groups have been found successful in reducing conflicts.6 The 
literature suggests that these type of anti-poverty programmes can reduce the capacity 
of insurgents to recruit combatants from villages, increase electoral support for the 
incumbent government (Labonne, 2013), and increase the cost of opportunity of joining 
illegal activities in settings with long-entrenched civil conflicts (Pena et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, it is unclear the extent to which countries with high rates of extreme 
poverty and exacerbated food vulnerability due to lockdowns will respond to the urgent 
and wide range of welfare and labour COVID-19 assistance packages. Many of the 
urgent welfare packages introduced are unconditional cash transfers that have shown to 
reduce food vulnerabilities and poverty in Africa as well as in other developing regions, 
but with a lesser known effect on conflict (Chakrabarti et al., 2020; Tiwari et al., 2016). 
 
5
 There is also mixed evidence on whether community driven programmes can indeed 
reduce poverty as they can be used for clientelistic purposes and suffer from corruption 
(Gutiérrez-Romero, 2013). 
6
 An example of such initiatives is the conditional cash transfer introduced in Colombia 
in 1999 in response to the major economic crises that affected Latin America (Familias 
en Acción). This conditional cash transfer reduced the probability of conflict and 
demobilised combatants, mainly children aged 10-17 (Pena et al., 2017). Similar 
evidence has been found in the Philippines (Crost et al., 2016). 
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Similarly, it is unclear whether governments in the developing world will have to rely 
on excessive use of force to guarantee lockdowns and curb potential violent unrests. 
We address these questions in the next sections. 
 
3. DATA 
3.1 Data on conflict 
The data for all the dependent variables used on conflict come from the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED collects real-time data on all 
reported political violence and protests around the globe using a range of sources such 
as government reports, local media, humanitarian agencies, and research publications 
(C. Raleigh & Dowd, 2016). It has the main advantage of providing georeferenced data 
at the sub-country level by day and month within each year.7  
 In this paper we focus exclusively on four types of conflicts: riots, violence 
against civilians, food-related conflicts, and more specifically, food looting reported in 
ACLED from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020. Riots are defined by ACLED as a 
violent form of demonstration. Violence against civilians is defined as any armed or 
violent group attacking unarmed civilians who are not engaged in political violence (C. 
Raleigh & Dowd, 2016). Governments, rebels, militias and rioters can all be involved 
in these violent acts against civilians that can include attacks, abduction, forced 
disappearance and sexual violence. Food-related conflicts are not directly categorised 
in the publically available ACLED dataset. However, we identify these food-related 
conflicts based on the detailed description of each of the events reported in ACLED. 
 We analyse the ACLED’s conflicts reported on a daily basis, that is without 
doing any aggregation on a monthly or yearly basis by country. This fine level of 
granularity as when the conflicts took place allows us to exploit the variation with which 
early social distancing measures, lockdowns and welfare/labour COVID-19 policy 
responses were implemented across countries.  
 
 
7
 ACLED provides the exact number of conflicts, associated fatalities, location, exact 
date and actors involved across six broad types of conflict (which can be sub-
categorised further). These six types of conflicts are: battles, explosions (e.g. suicide 
bombs, grenades), violence against civilians, protests, riots and strategic developments 
(e.g. non-violent actions on agreements, arrests, disrupted weapons use, etc). 
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3.2 Dates of social distancing and lockdowns measures 
As COVID-19 spread around the globe, a wide range of social distancing measures and 
more strict lockdowns have been implemented. We obtain the exact date on which the 
first ever social distancing was implemented as well as the date of local lockdowns8  
from the publically available data on COVID-19 Government Response Tracker 
(OxCGRT), by Hale et al. (2020).9   At the time of writing this paper, OxCGRT did 
not include data on social distancing measures for 13 African countries (Benin, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Somalia and Tongo).10  For all these 
13 countries, we took information on the exact date of early social distancing and 
lockdown from ACAPS (2020). From this database, we also took the period of the 
lockdown of Nigeria. Table A.1, in the Appendix, lists the dates of early social 
distancing and lockdowns for the countries we focus on in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
8
 We obtain the exact date of lockdowns based on the date in which any of the eight 
reported social distancing measures took the highest ordinal value of 4, signalling the 
severity of lockdown. 
9
 OxCGRT provides exact dates on when each of the social distancing measures were 
implemented across 149 countries, from January 2020 until 29 April 2020. This 
database contains the exact data on eight types of social distancing. These include: 
international travel restrictions, limitations on internal movement, closure of schools, 
closure of workplace, cancellations of public events, restrictions of large gatherings, 
stay at home requirements and restrictions on public transport.  This information was 
collected from media, government reports and other publicly available sources. Another 
advantage of this dataset is that it provides an ordinal value of 1-4 to each of the eight 
social distancing implemented that helps to ascertain the level of their severity. The full 
methodology on how this dataset was collected and is being developed is available in 
the live report provided by (Hale et al., 2020).   
10
 We do not have data on local prices for all these additional countries, but the dates of 
their lockdowns help doing the preliminary spatial analysis as well as the regression 
discontinuity plots presented in section 3.    
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3.3 Constructing a monthly local index of prices at the market level 
To measure the link between food vulnerability and conflict, we use data from the 
Global Food Prices Database (WFP). This dataset reports monthly commodity prices at 
a sub-country level, across 985 local markets, in 23 African countries from the 1990s 
until May 2020 for which there is also information on conflicts in ACLED. We add 
information for Zimbabwe not included in WFP, from the USAID FEWS-NET dataset 
that also provides monthly local food prices. We focus our analysis on the 24 African 
countries, listed in Table A.1 that shows the countries for which we have data on local 
prices from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020.   
 The two sources of local prices used report a wide range of commodities, which 
are often not consistent across countries given the differences in diet and staple foods. 
Thus, we construct instead an index of monthly price of the most frequent commodity 
within each market.11 This approach has also been used in the literature to overcome 
the variance in commodity baskets within and across countries (Clionad Raleigh et al., 
2015). In our econometric analysis, we take January 2015 as the base for the index for 
each market, which allows us to assess to what extent the index of local prices has 
changed since then. For each conflict reported in ACLED we add the local price index 
of their closest food market within the same month, year and country where the conflict 
took place.  
   
3.4 Constructing an index of welfare and labour COVID-19 policy  
We construct an overall welfare and labour index based on these 12 different types of 
interventions implemented to deal with COVID-19, compiled by (Gentilini et al., 2020). 
By the period of our analysis, 1 May 2020, a total of 159 countries had implemented 
some sort of welfare and labour COVID-19 policy.12 We use a simple additive 
 
11
 That is for each market we construct a consumer price index as the sum of the total 
expenditure of most common items sold by multiplying price times quantity and adding 
them. The basket compared in each market is such that can be comparable over time. 
Then we divide the monthly consumer price index by the value of the index in the base 
year (January 2015). 
12
 These can be grouped into three broad categories. The first one, social assistance 
interventions include: cash-based transfers, public works, in-kind/school feeding and 
utility/financial support. The second, social insurance policies include: paid 
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unweighted index to measure the whole range of various welfare and labour COVID-
19 policy response.13 In theory our index can take values from 0 (no intervention) up to 
1 (a country that has taken all 12 types of interventions). In practice, the overall index 
ranges from 0 to slightly above 0.4 (that is, with five ongoing policies). Since Gentilini 
et al. (2020) do not include the exact date as when these interventions have been put in 
place, we take this information instead from Hale et al. (2020). 14   
Table A.2 in Appendix lists the welfare and labour policies implemented in each 
of the 24 African countries we focus on. From the 19 countries with an on-going 
COVID-19 welfare and labour policy, 12 have provided cash-transfers (among other 
policies); while the other seven have provided utility and financial support.  Labour 
interventions are the least used thus far. Among the 24 countries analysed, only Egypt 
has adopted recent labour regulations. 
 
 
leave/unemployment, health insurance support, pensions and disability benefits and 
social security contributions. The last one, labour market interventions: include wage 
subsidy, training, labour regulation and reduced work time subsidy. 
13
 Various methods can be used to create composite indices such as additive, 
multiplicative and weighting some aspects with principal components analysis (Hale et 
al., 2020). We use the additive method as there are few interventions which might not 
merit using principal component analysis. We are not interested either in which policy 
explains the most variance in responses, rather to simply come with an index that 
measures the whole range of interventions in each country, which has the advantage of 
being simpler to interpret. 
14
 To construct the index of welfare and labour COVID-19 response packages we prefer 
to use Gentilini et al. (2020) given the more extensive list of actions and programmes 
taken in each country 12 concrete actions over four categories of actions reported in 
Hale et al. (2020). 
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Figure 1: COVID-19 policy response index across Africa, as of 1 May 2020 
Source: Own estimates using Gentilini et al. (2020). 
 
3.5 Other important controls at sub-country level 
Based on the extensive literature on conflict, we also include a wide range of control 
variables to mitigate potential confounding or unobserved characteristics. At the 
country-level, we include the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index. At the district 
level, we use the monthly average of the stable nightlight luminosity from the DMSP-
OLS Nighttime Light, from the USA Air Force Weather Agency. To avoid potential 
endogeneity issues, we use the monthly nightlight for the year 2015 only. We also use 
the log of the cultivated district, and size of the area (district) taken from the publicly 
available data from Rezaeedaryakenari et al. (2020). The remaining controls are drawn 
from the publicly available data from Manacorda and Tesei (2020) that allows us to 
construct data on georeferenced areas of on average about 55x55 km to each of the 
conflict events reported in ACLED. The variables used are the mobile phone coverage 
of 2G-3G, percentage of mountains, percentage of forests, the existence of petroleum 
fields, mines, diamond mines, electricity coverage, primary roads coverage, population 
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and infant mortality rate.  In Table A.3 we list the sources of each variable.15 These 
variables help us to control for natural resources conflicts (N. Berman, Couttenier, 
Rohner, & Thoenig, 2017; Fenske & Zurimendi, 2017). Population size and mountains 
are also among the most relevant and statistically significant controls in the conflict 
literature (Collier & Hoeffler, 2014). Mobile phone coverage has been found crucial for 
political mobilisation and riots (Manacorda & Tesei, 2020). Similarly, the density of 
roads is important for the spatial distribution of conflict in Africa (Detges, 2016).   
 
3.6 Instrumental variables 
COVID-19 interventions have been highly dependent on political and economic 
contexts. Hence it would be hard to argue that social distancing, lockdowns and 
welfare/labour COVID-19 policy response have been exogenous or independent from 
existing conflicts within each country. For this reason, our econometric specification 
focuses on using instrumental variables. We use four instruments. We use the male 
mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air pollution per 100,000, based on 
standardised age, at the national level for the year 2016 and the percentage of diabetes 
prevalence among the adult population (aged 20 -79) at the national level over the years 
2010-2019. Both instruments have been found in the medical literature as risk factors 
to COVID-19 (Fattorini & Regoli, 2020; Hussain et al., 2020), thus are likely to 
influence state’s decision as to when to impose social distancing measures and the 
severity of lockdowns. We also include the IMF overall commodity monthly price 
index over the years 2015-2020 (including food, agriculture, fuel and non-fuel prices). 
This index is representative of the global market and is determined by the largest import 
market of a given commodity. This overall index helps to denote the severity of external 
fluctuations which might affect how countries respond to adopt different welfare and 
labour COVID-19 policies. The extent of the generosity of these packages is likely to 
depend on existing welfare structures and institutions, thus is likely shaped by colonial 
heritage (Nash & Patel, 2019). Hence, we also include a series of dummy variables 
denoting whether the country is a former British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian 
 
15
 We do not describe these variables in detail here as we refer the reader to the detailed 
description available in Manacorda and Tesei’s article. We take this information for the 
latest year available in their series, year 2012.  
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or American Colonisation Society colony. Table A.3 lists the sources of these 
instruments. 
 
3.7 Description of conflicts 
We start by providing a broad description of the conflicts reported in ACLED for the 
entire African continent from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show 
that soon after lockdowns the incidence of riots, violence against civilians and food-
related conflicts increased when compared to the incidence of these conflicts to the 
period before lockdowns.  
 
 
Figure 2: ACLED’s riots before and after lockdown. 
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Figure 3: ACLED’s violence against civilians before and after lockdown. 
 
 
Figure 4: ACLED’s food-related violence before and after lockdown. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the spatial distribution of riots, violence against civilians and 
food-related violence before (1 January 2015-before lockdown) and after lockdowns. 
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concentrated in areas that had already ongoing conflicts. The maps on the right side of 
Figure 5 also shows that food-related conflicts are more concentrated in areas with a 
higher share of cultivated land (denoted by a darker colour). In a pre-COVID study, 
Rezaeedaryakenari et al. (2020) had noted the same spatial correlation. They suggested 
that the areas with more cultivation provide greater utility for forcible appropriation by 
rebels for the acquisition of food. When the aggregate food supply shrinks, as is likely 
the case after lockdowns, these geographical regions become a priority target.    
Since we are concerned with the role of food volatility, the rest of our analysis 
focuses exclusively on the 24 countries for which we have data on local food prices. 
Table A.4 provides a summary description for these 24 countries from 1 January 2015 
until 2 May 2020. In total there are 42,010 conflicts reported (including battles, 
explosions (e.g. suicide bombs, grenades), violence against civilians, protests, riots and 
strategic developments. About a third of these events (28%) were violence against 
civilians and nearly a quarter (13%) was riots, with a minority of food-related conflicts 
and food looting (2%). The state has been involved as an actor in nearly 32% of all 
reported ACLED conflict cases.  
The total and average of the fatalities per event are also reported in Table A.4. 
In total there were 169,454 fatalities associated with any conflict reported in ACLED, 
from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020. There were 4,552 fatalities associated with riots, 
50,506 fatalities associated with violence against civilians and 6,888 fatalities 
associated with any food-related conflicts (including food looting), with 4,344 fatalities 
due to food looting.   
Figure 6 illustrates the potential link between violence against civilians, local 
food prices and the IMF global commodity index. We focus only on the 24 countries 
for which we have local food prices. Only for Figure 6 we aggregate the data at monthly 
level for each country. We also standardise each of the three depicted variables such 
that their monthly average is divided by the maximum value of each variable for the 
entire series. Thus, the y-axis shows how much the monthly series fluctuates from the 
highest level achieved within each country. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5. Conflict and lockdowns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For some countries, there is a particularly strong correlation between local food 
prices and conflicts such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda. However, there are many 
exceptions where the local prices have increased, whereas violence against civilians has 
not. That is the case of Burkina Faso, Malawi and Namibia.  This evidence might 
suggest that albeit rises in food prices might have contributed to some conflicts, but the 
welfare and labour COVID-19 interventions could have dampened some of the violence 
against civilians. We analyse these issues next. 
 
 
Figure 6: Monthly prices and ACLED’s violence against civilians. 
  
4. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK  
We use two econometric specifications to estimate the impact of social distancing 
measures, price volatility and welfare and labour COVID-19 policies on conflict. First, 
we use a panel random effects (RE) model, as shown in equation (1). The RE model 
has two main advantages. First, this specification can simultaneously model both time-
variant and time-invariant effects (Bell & Jones, 2015). Second, the RE specification 
can deal with hierarchical data (in our case having repeated observations in sub-country 
level, cells, nested within countries, the higher-level fixed units), the reason why this 
specification is also known as the multilevel, hierarchical or mixed model.  
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           conflictjit = α + δ1Sit + δ2log local pricejit + δ3Xji + δ4Ci +  (ηji +εjit)                       (1) 
 
We focus on the incidence of four types of conflicts: riots, violence against 
civilians, food-related conflict incidents and food looting in the cell j (with reported 
latitude and longitude in ACLED) located in country i in day, month and year t 
(conflictjit). Our dependent variable is binary for each of the four types of conflicts 
analysed. Sit is a vector that includes the three COVID-19 interventions we focus on: 
the first social distancing measure implemented16, local lockdown measure and the 
welfare and labour COVID-19 policy index in country i implemented at day, month, 
year t. The first social distancing measure refers to the date in which this was 
implemented. Lockdown takes the value of 0 or 1 depending on if the conflict occurred 
before or after the respective lockdown. The monthly local price index (measured in 
log) at cell j in country i ranges from January 2015 until 2 May 2020. Xji is a vector that 
captures our controls at the cell j located in country i and includes: the percentage of 
mountains, forests, whether the cell has petroleum fields, mines, diamond mines, size 
of the area (district level). In addition, vector X includes some key variables lagged in 
time to mitigate potential endogeneity issues. These lagged variables are the stable 
nightlight (measured in log for the year 2015), the percentage of mobile phone coverage 
in 2G-3G, the percentage of electricity coverage, primary roads coverage, population, 
infant mortality, percentage of land cultivated.  Vector C includes the ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation index, at country level i. (ηji +εjit) denotes the time-invariant and time-
variant error term.
  
The results of the RE specifications are shown in Table 1, columns 
1-4. 
 
 
 The RE estimates will be unbiased if there are no strong sources of endogeneity 
such as omitted variable due to unobserved heterogeneity. However, we suspect that 
the RE specifications are biased, given the unlikely exogenous characteristics of the 
three COVID-19 interventions we focused on.  We therefore add to our RE specification 
IV-2SLS estimates to address this potential endogeneity.  We instrument our three 
likely endogenous variables: the date of the first social distancing measure, whether in 
 
16
 This index takes the value of 0 before any policy included in the index was 
implemented, and takes the value of the constructed index after the first welfare/labour 
COVID- response policy was implemented according to Hale et al. (2020). 
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lockdown and the welfare and labour COVID-19 policy index denoted by Sit. Our 
instruments, denoted by vector Zit, are: male mortality rate attributed to household and 
ambient air pollution per 100,000 (lagged for year 2016), diabetes prevalence (% of 
population ages 20 to 79, years 2010-2019), IMF all commodity price index (years 
2015-2020), whether the country is a former British, French, Portuguese, German, 
Belgian or American Colonisation Society colony. The first-stage relationship between 
our three endogenous variables, Sit. and our instruments Zit are shown in equation (2).  
              
                   Sit = γ + µ1Zit + µ2log local pricejit + µ3Xji + µ4Ci + vjit                               (2) 
      
The second-stage equation estimates the impact of the instrumented Ŝ COVID-
19 responses on the incidence of conflict, as denoted by equation (3). The (ξji +ϕjit) 
denotes the time-invariant and time-variant error term.
  
We implement this IV 
regression using panel random effects. 
           
           conflictjit = κ + β1Ŝit + β2log local pricejit + β3Xji + β4Ci + (ξji +ϕjit)                        (3) 
  
The results of the second-stage IV-2SLS regression are reported in Table (1), in 
columns 5-8. At the bottom of the table, we report the Sargan-Hanssen 
overidentification tests. The null hypothesis of this test is that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. We also present the Hausman endogeneity test. The first-stage 
regression is shown in Table A.5. In sum, all our instruments are strongly correlated to 
the endogenous variables, satisfy the overidentification tests. There is evidence that the 
COVID-19 measures of lockdowns and welfare assistance are endogenous, hence 
implemented in response to conflicts, in particular in column 6 and 7 (violence against 
civilians and food-related incidents).  Therefore these second-stage IV 2SLS 
regressions are our preferred specifications. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 Riots, violence against civilians and food-related conflict 
Early social distancing measures are not statistically significant with the incidence of 
the conflicts analysed, riots, violence against civilians food-related conflicts and food 
looting. That is the case in the random specifications RE with and without using 
instrumental variables (Table 1, columns 1-8). The non-significant effect is 
unsurprising since many of these early measures did not impose any mobility 
restrictions on the population but mostly focused on having some travel restrictions 
from abroad. The stricter lockdown measures yield different results. If focused on the 
IV-2SLS results, Table 1, columns 5-8, show that the probability of experiencing riots, 
violence against civilians, food-related conflicts and food looting did increase after 
lockdowns, as our earlier figures 2, 3 and 4 had shown.  
Table 1 also shows that contemporaneous changes in prices are positively and 
statistically associated with violence against civilians (but not to riots, food-related 
conflicts or food looting). Specifically, a 10% increase in the value of the local price 
index is associated with a rise of 0.71 percentage point increase in violence against 
civilians. The same results are obtained when using the RE specifications with or 
without instrumenting. Among other variables prominently cited in the literature, we 
can conclude that riots are more likely to occur in more urbanised settings as they have 
higher levels of stable nightlight, mobile phone, electricity coverage and population. In 
contrast, violence against civilians seems to be concentrated in less urbanised settings 
as they have lower levels of stable nightlight, less electricity coverage, primary roads, 
but more cultivated land and mines. 
Food-related incidents and food looting are more likely to occur in areas with a 
greater density of cultivated land, as Figure 5 suggested. However, the volatility of local 
prices is not associated with these food-related conflicts. These areas seem to be less 
urbanised as they have less density of primary roads, electricity.  
There is also strong evidence from the IV-2SLS specifications that the welfare 
and labour COVID-19 policy index has reduced the probability of riots, violence 
against civilians and food-related conflicts, including food looting. For instance, 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the marginal effect of the probability of experiencing riots, 
violence against civilians and food-related conflicts with the values of the welfare and 
labour COVID-19 policy index. These marginal effects depict the IV-2SLS 
specifications shown in Table 1, columns 5-7. The effect of the index is negative and 
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linearly associated with the probability of experiencing riots. Specifically, a 0.1 unit 
increase in the welfare/labour COVID-19 policy index, the likelihood of experiencing 
these conflicts declines by nearly 0.2 percentage points.   
 
 Table 1. COVID-19 interventions, local prices and conflict  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Riots and the welfare/labour COVID-19 policy index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Riots
Violence against 
civilians
Food-related 
incidents Food looting Riots
Violence against 
civilians
Food-related 
incidents Food looting
First social distancing implemented 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Strict lockdown 0.020* 0.078*** 0.021*** 0.009** 0.154*** 0.110* 0.127*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.045) (0.060) (0.022) (0.017)
Index of welfare and labour COVID19 response -0.048 0.066 -0.048** -0.030* -0.666** -2.124*** -0.886*** -0.394***
(0.048) (0.063) (0.023) (0.018) (0.282) (0.378) (0.138) (0.108)
Log index local market price -0.004 0.073*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.071*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) 0.012*** -0.051*** 0.002 0.002 0.013*** -0.049*** 0.003* 0.003*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G 0.027*** -0.005 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.027*** -0.005 -0.003** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
% Mountains -0.056*** 0.035*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.057*** 0.029*** -0.011*** -0.009***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
% Forests 0.035*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.031*** 0.035*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.031***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004)
Petroleum fields 0.023** 0.062*** -0.007 -0.004 0.021** 0.055*** -0.010** -0.005
(0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004)
Mines -0.010*** 0.021*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.010*** 0.020*** -0.003* -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Diamond mines 0.003 -0.017** -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.015** -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of area 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity 0.045*** -0.061*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.046*** -0.063*** -0.009*** -0.006***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
Primary roads -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.003** -0.003***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Log population 0.010*** -0.003 -0.002* -0.001 0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Log infant mortality rate 0.000 -0.140*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.002 -0.147*** 0.039*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004)
Log cultivated -0.001 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.001 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index 0.107 -0.125 -0.014 -0.017 0.110 -0.186 -0.030 -0.027
(0.137) (0.100) (0.024) (0.016) (0.242) (0.184) (0.048) (0.036)
Constant -37.788 22.619 6.272 5.268 -41.348 57.267 13.611 10.661
(29.795) (21.332) (4.964) (3.256) (94.867) (71.291) (18.369) (13.672)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Test of overidentification restrictions:
Sargan-Hanssen statistics Chi-sq(1) 2.134 9.463 4.772 3.615
P-value 0.907 0.149 0.573 0.730
Hausman test
Chi2 11.350 167.050 46.530 21.680
Prob>chi2 0.838 0.000 0.000 0.198
Panel Random Effects (RE) Panel RE IV specifications
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Figure 8: Violence against civilians and the welfare/labour COVID-19 policy index 
 
 
Figure 9: Food-related violence and the welfare/labour COVID-19 policy index 
 
5.2 Fatalities  
We next explore the total number of fatalities, as our new dependent variables to assess 
the magnitude of the conflicts analysed thus far. We analyse the number of fatalities 
reported in ACLED from 1 January 2015 until 2 May 2020 associated with any conflict. 
We also focus on the number of fatalities exclusively related to the conflicts of our 
interest: riots, violence against civilians and food-related conflicts (including food 
looting). As before, we use two specifications: panel random effects (RE) and panel 
random effects with IV-2SLS. Table 2 reports the results. As before at the bottom of 
the table, we report the Sargan-Hanssen overidentification test and the Hausman 
endogeneity tests. The first-stage regression results are reported in Table A.6. These 
first-stage regressions, along with the overidentification tests, suggest the instruments 
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are valid.  Again, we find evidence of endogeneity, particularly for all ACLED fatalities 
and fatalities due to violence against civilians (Table 2, columns 5 and 7). 
The IV-2SLS specifications show that early social distancing measures have no 
increased association with fatalities (Table 2, columns 5-8). However, the number of 
fatalities increased substantially after lockdowns for all ACLED fatalities (columns 5), 
and fatalities associated with violence against civilians (column 7). There is no evidence 
of increased fatalities associated with food-related conflict. For this type of conflict, we 
added any fatalities associated with food looting as well.  
 There is evidence that countries with a higher welfare and labour COVID-19 
policy index experienced lower levels of overall ACLED’s fatalities as well as a lower 
level of fatalities due to violence against civilians (Table 2, columns 5 and 7). Figure 
10 shows these marginal effects. For instance, the number of total fatalities, decrease 
by nearly ten casualties when comparing a country with no welfare and labour COVID-
19 policy response versus one that has an index of 0.4.  
 As mentioned earlier (Table 1) higher local prices are not associated with a 
higher probability of experiencing food-related conflicts. However, Table 2, reveals 
that increases in local prices are associated with a higher number of fatalities due to 
food-related conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 10: Overall fatalities and fatalities due to violence against. 
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Table 2. COVID-19 interventions, local prices and fatalities  
 
 
 
5.3 The state as an actor in riots, violence against civilians and food-related conflicts 
To conclude our analysis, we focus on the conflicts in which the state has been directly 
involved as an actor (either instigating or responding to contain violence) and 
distinguish between riots, violence against civilians and food related conflicts. We 
identify whether the state was involved as an actor whether in its capacity as the 
military, the police, the government or government’s guards. We obtain this 
information from the detailed notes revealed in ACLED’s database.  
As before we present two specifications, panel random effects (RE) and panel 
random effects with IV-2SLS. Table 3 presents both specifications, and Table A.7 
shows the first-stage IV-2SLS specifications.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fatalaties of:
Any ACLED 
conflict Riots
Violence against 
civilians
Food-related 
conflict
Any ACLED 
conflict Riots
Violence against 
civilians
Food-related 
conflict
First social distancing implemented -0.024*** 0.001 -0.014*** -0.002*** -0.033 0.000 -0.007 -0.002***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.035) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001)
Strict lockdown 0.310 0.017 -0.111 0.021 5.997*** 0.192 2.396*** 0.061
(0.277) (0.029) (0.208) (0.035) (1.206) (0.129) (0.911) (0.167)
Index of welfare and labour COVID19 response -2.057 -0.052 -0.864 0.102 -26.693*** -0.345 -13.333** -0.809
(1.266) (0.134) (0.948) (0.160) (7.537) (0.804) (5.692) (1.048)
Log index local market price -0.240** -0.018 0.051 0.033*** -0.240* -0.019 -0.020 0.035**
(0.120) (0.013) (0.070) (0.012) (0.125) (0.013) (0.093) (0.014)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) -0.037 0.010 0.103 0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.145** 0.011
(0.095) (0.010) (0.065) (0.011) (0.100) (0.010) (0.074) (0.012)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -0.692*** 0.017*** -0.105*** -0.043*** -0.708*** 0.018*** -0.085* -0.040***
(0.059) (0.006) (0.038) (0.006) (0.061) (0.006) (0.045) (0.007)
% Mountains 0.113 -0.053*** -0.149 -0.016 0.077 -0.055*** -0.155 0.001
(0.197) (0.021) (0.123) (0.021) (0.205) (0.021) (0.153) (0.024)
% Forests -2.189*** -0.010 -0.433*** -0.157*** -2.174*** -0.016 -0.754*** -0.166***
(0.258) (0.027) (0.161) (0.027) (0.272) (0.028) (0.202) (0.031)
Petroleum fields -1.674*** -0.045* -0.424** -0.042 -1.809*** -0.045* -0.698*** -0.063**
(0.244) (0.026) (0.169) (0.028) (0.251) (0.026) (0.187) (0.030)
Mines 0.098 -0.015* 0.018 -0.013 0.094 -0.015* 0.113* -0.010
(0.078) (0.008) (0.057) (0.010) (0.079) (0.008) (0.059) (0.010)
Diamond mines 0.312** -0.004 0.243** 0.009 0.360** -0.003 0.289*** 0.015
(0.137) (0.014) (0.101) (0.017) (0.141) (0.015) (0.105) (0.017)
Size of area 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity 0.012 0.067*** -0.018 -0.040** 0.072 0.066*** 0.014 -0.036**
(0.142) (0.015) (0.093) (0.016) (0.147) (0.015) (0.110) (0.017)
Primary roads 0.062 -0.021*** -0.043 -0.011** 0.063 -0.018** -0.034 -0.016**
(0.069) (0.007) (0.033) (0.006) (0.074) (0.008) (0.055) (0.007)
Log population -0.433*** 0.005 -0.175*** 0.000 -0.444*** 0.004 -0.265*** -0.004
(0.051) (0.005) (0.035) (0.006) (0.053) (0.006) (0.039) (0.006)
Log infant mortality rate 1.139*** 0.040* 0.343*** 0.038** 1.294*** 0.046 -0.087 0.071***
(0.238) (0.024) (0.092) (0.015) (0.282) (0.028) (0.205) (0.026)
Log cultivated 0.351*** 0.002 0.396*** 0.034*** 0.321*** 0.001 0.211*** 0.029**
(0.099) (0.010) (0.064) (0.011) (0.103) (0.011) (0.077) (0.012)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index 0.321 -0.013 -0.113 -0.093** 0.137 -0.024 0.105 -0.143**
(0.723) (0.068) (0.218) (0.036) (2.036) (0.118) (1.058) (0.065)
Constant 538.073*** -15.911 302.793*** 39.856*** 725.467 -10.325 153.514 53.191***
(143.598) (13.415) (39.689) (6.589) (759.140) (40.408) (376.244) (18.644)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Test of overidentification restrictions:
Sargan-Hanssen statistics Chi-sq(1) 0.499 3.081 2.140 4.716
P-value 0.998 0.799 0.906 0.581
Hausman test
Chi2 40.080 11.960 104.890 18.850
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.803 0.000 0.337
Panel Random Effects (RE) Panel RE IV specifications
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Table 3. COVID-19 interventions, local prices and the state as perpetrator of violence 
 
 
The Sargan-Hanssen overidentification tests show that the instruments satisfy 
the overidentification restrictions. Also, the Hausman tests suggest the IV-2SLS 
specifications should be preferred. According to these specifications, since the local 
lockdowns, the instances where the state is involved in food-related conflicts has 
increased (column 8). However, we find that in countries that have provided a higher 
number of welfare and labour anti-poverty policies, the state is less likely to be involved 
as an actor in food-related conflicts. In contrast, in these countries the state is more 
likely to be involved as an actor in violence against civilians (column 7), but perhaps in 
ensuring lockdowns and preventing unrests. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State (military, policy, gard or government) involved as actor in: 
Any ACLED 
conflict Riots
Violence 
against 
Food-related 
conflict
Any ACLED 
conflict Riots
Violence 
against 
Food-related 
conflict
First social distancing implemented -0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Strict lockdown 0.071*** 0.015** 0.064*** 0.006** -0.300*** 0.001 -0.086*** 0.018*
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.065) (0.029) (0.031) (0.011)
Index of welfare and labour COVID19 response 0.111 -0.023 0.057* -0.002 2.563*** 0.104 0.486** -0.126*
(0.068) (0.031) (0.033) (0.011) (0.407) (0.184) (0.195) (0.066)
Log index local market price -0.016** -0.003 0.010*** 0.001 -0.017*** -0.003 0.009*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) 0.030*** 0.017*** -0.001 -0.001 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -0.049*** 0.011*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.049*** 0.011*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
% Mountains 0.047*** -0.028*** 0.035*** -0.000 0.044*** -0.028*** 0.033*** -0.000
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
% Forests -0.059*** -0.004 0.034*** -0.008*** -0.064*** -0.005 0.033*** -0.008***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Petroleum fields -0.107*** -0.012** 0.003 -0.003 -0.098*** -0.012* 0.005 -0.004
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
Mines -0.007* -0.003* -0.004* -0.000 -0.005 -0.003* -0.003* -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Diamond mines 0.019** -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.014* -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Size of area -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity 0.012 0.028*** 0.005 -0.004*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.003 -0.004***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Primary roads 0.021*** -0.000 0.004* -0.000 0.026*** -0.000 0.004* 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log population -0.026*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.027*** -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Log infant mortality rate 0.079*** 0.001 -0.018** 0.006*** 0.063*** 0.001 -0.027*** 0.008***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Log cultivated -0.027*** -0.004* -0.017*** 0.001 -0.031*** -0.004* -0.017*** 0.002**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index -0.015 0.058 -0.019 -0.007* 0.037 0.065 0.000 -0.005
(0.056) (0.058) (0.031) (0.004) (0.114) (0.088) (0.075) (0.011)
Constant 43.927*** -17.621 10.271 1.157 20.167 -21.776 -2.595 -0.004
(11.585) (12.437) (6.442) (0.816) (42.825) (33.827) (28.750) (4.000)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Test of overidentification restrictions:
Sargan-Hanssen statistics Chi-sq(1) 9.349 1.865 3.949 5.014
P-value 0.155 0.932 0.684 0.542
Hausman test
Chi2 62.150 3.360 68.150 32.720
Prob>chi2 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.012
Panel RE IV specifications Panel RE IV specifications
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6. CONCLUSION 
We analysed the impact of social distancing measures, food vulnerability, welfare and 
labour COVID-19 policy response on conflict. Our IV-2SLS specifications revealed 
that despite the restrictions on population mobility, riots, violence against civilians and 
food-related increased after lockdowns. Food insecurity, in terms of volatility of local 
prices, was found to be associated with a higher probability of a country experiencing 
violence against civilians. Nonetheless, we also found that countries with a higher index 
of welfare and labour COVID-19 policy response are less likely to have suffered these 
conflicts and less likely to have experienced fatalities as a result of violence against 
civilians and any other conflicts. We also found that since the lockdown states have 
been more heavily involved as actors in food-related conflicts. However, states with 
higher welfare and labour COVID-19 policy index also are less likely to have to 
intervene in food-related conflicts directly.  
The implications of our analysis are important from a public policy perspective. 
Food vulnerability and price volatility are an explosive combination for conflicts as 
they provide an opportunity for rebel groups to attack civilians, particularly in areas 
with a high level of cultivation. Indeed, we found evidence that food vulnerability has 
increased the probability of experiencing violence against civilians. This evidence is 
well in line with the theoretical literature that suggests vulnerable citizens are more 
likely to join riots and fall prey to organised armed groups (Rezaeedaryakenari et al., 
2020). However, our results also indicate that state’s actions in terms of delivering 
urgent welfare assistance can reduce the probability of experiencing riots, violence 
against civilians, food-related conflicts as well as their associated casualties. Although 
the association found is weak, the findings are encouraging to suggest that urgent state 
interventions can reduce food vulnerability and prevent major social unrest.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. Countries analysed with data on local food prices at sub-level until 2020 
 
 
Sources: Conflict events, ACLED. Dates on social distancing and lockdowns own 
estimates using ACAPS (2020) and Hale et al. (2020). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Freq. Percent
Date of first social 
distancing
Date of start of local 
lockdown
Algeria 4,558 10.85 10-Mar-20 10-Mar-20
Angola 301 0.72 06-Feb-20 20-Mar-20
Benin 169 0.4 03-Mar-20 19-Mar-20
Burkina Faso 2,013 4.79 01-Jan-20 12-Mar-20
Burundi 5,525 13.15 06-Mar-20 12-Mar-20
Cameroon 2,619 6.23 01-Jan-20 18-Mar-20
Central African Republic 458 1.09 29-Jan-20 13-Mar-20
Democratic Republic of Congo 5,630 13.4 20-Feb-20 18-Mar-20
Ethiopia 1,389 3.31 16-Mar-20 16-Mar-20
Gabon 155 0.37 07-Feb-20 13-Mar-20
Ghana 715 1.7 24-Jan-20 16-Mar-20
Guinea 886 2.11 29-Feb-20 26-Mar-20
Kenya 2,528 6.02 20-Jan-20 13-Mar-20
Lesotho 39 0.09 06-Mar-20 18-Mar-20
Liberia 340 0.81 09-Mar-20 11-Apr-20
Madagascar 771 1.84 15-Mar-20 20-Mar-20
Malawi 405 0.96 16-Mar-20 16-Mar-20
Mali 1,206 2.87 19-Mar-20 19-Mar-20
Mauritania 42 0.1 05-Feb-20 16-Mar-20
Namibia 242 0.58 01-Mar-20 17-Mar-20
Niger 737 1.75 13-Mar-20 13-Mar-20
Nigeria 9,824 23.38 01-Jan-20 29/03/2020
Rwanda 93 0.22 27-Jan-20 08-Mar-20
Zimbabwe 1,365 3.25 28-Jan-20 17-Mar-20
Total ACLED events 42,010 100
Table A.2. Welfare and labour COVID-19 policy response of 24 countries analysed 
 
Note: - No programme implemented until 1 May 2020. Source: Gentilini et al. (2020).  
 
SOCIAL INSURANCE LABOUR MARKETS
Overall Cash- Public In-kind (in- Utility and Paid Health Pensions Social security Labour Reduced 
COVID-19 Public based Works kind/school financial leave/ insurance and disability contributions Wage Activation regulation work time
index transfers feeding) support unemployment support benefits (waiver/subsidy)(waiver/subsidy) (training) adjustment subsidy
Algeria 0.417 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Angola 0.083 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benin 0.083 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 0.250 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burundi 0.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Cameroon 0.083 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Central African Republic 0.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia 0.333 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Gabon 0.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ghana 0.250 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Guinea 0.167 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 0.167 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 0.000 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Liberia 0.167 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 0.250 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Malawi 0.083 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 0.167 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritania 0.167 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Namibia 0.167 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Niger 0.083 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 0.250 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 0.333 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 0.083 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
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Table A.3. Data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Source
All conflicts analysed, fatalities, and state involved as actor Own construction using ACLED.
Date of social distancing and lockdowns Own construction using Hale et al. (2020) and ACAPS (2020).
Index of welfare and labour COVID-19 response Own construction using Gentilini et al. (2020).
Date of start of welfare/labour COVID-19 response Own construction using Hale et al. (2020). 
Index local market price Own construction using the Global Food Prices Database (WFP) and for Zimbabwe only the USAID FEWS-NET.
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) USA Air Force Weather Agency.
Cultivated land by district Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis and Thies' (2020). Publicly available data. They used the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) of Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
Size of area (district) Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis and Thies' (2020). Publicly available data. 
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Association.
% Mountains Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used UNEP-WCMC.
% Forests Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used GLOBCover.
Petroleum fields Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used PRIO.
Mines Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used USA Geological Survey.
Diamond mines Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used PRIO.
Electricity Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used the Africa  Infraestructure Country diagnostic (ADB).
Primary roads Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used the Africa  Infraestructure Country diagnostic (ADB).
Population Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used SEDAC/NASA.
Log infant mortality rate Manacorda and Tesei’s (2020) publicly available data. They used SEDAC/NASA.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index Altas Maradov Mira
Male mortality rate attributed to household and ambient 
air pollution, age-standarised at national level, year 2016 World Bank data repository
Adult diabetes prevalence (% of population ages 20 to 79) 
at national level World Bank data repository
IMF global commodity price IMF data repository
 Table A.4. Summary statistics of countries analysed 
 
Variable Total Mean Std. Dev. Total Mean Std. Dev. Total Mean Std. Dev.
Riots 12572 0.13 0.33 524 0.08 0.28 346 0.135 0.342
Violence against civilians 24745 0.28 0.45 1304 0.23 0.42 854 0.384 0.487
Food-related incidents 2871 0.02 0.16 174 0.03 0.17 160 0.047 0.211
Food looting 1798 0.02 0.12 110 0.02 0.13 107 0.026 0.160
Fatalaties any ACLED conflict 169454 1.66 8.59 6489 1.08 3.71 4616 1.894 6.172
Fatalalties to riots 4552 0.06 0.89 272 0.04 0.36 134 0.065 0.415
Fatalaties to violence against civilians 50506 0.69 6.37 1816 0.38 1.81 1236 0.583 2.360
Fatalaties to food-related conflict 6888 0.05 1.08 235 0.04 0.78 290 0.092 2.482
Fatalities to food looting 4344 0.03 0.80 154 0.03 0.71 225 0.077 2.447
State involved as actor in any ACLED conflict 40237 0.32 0.47 2083 0.26 0.44 1548 0.404 0.491
State involved as actor in riots 4710 0.05 0.21 180 0.03 0.17 157 0.056 0.231
State involved as actor in violence against civilians 5309 0.05 0.22 225 0.03 0.17 279 0.114 0.318
State involved as actor in food-related conflict 691 0.01 0.07 23 0.00 0.06 41 0.011 0.106
State involved as actor in food looting 396 0.00 0.05 10 0.00 0.04 26 0.007 0.082
Controls and instruments
Log index local market price 4.82 0.49 4.74 0.40 4.768 0.411
Adult diabetes prevalence (% of population ages 20 to 79) 4.26 1.73 5.01 1.70 4.696 1.739
IMF global commodity price 113.80 11.68 116.60 2.78 86.988 4.413
Log stable nightlight, year 2015 1.92 0.72
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -0.52 0.93
% Mountains 0.33 0.34
% Forests 0.24 0.22
Petroleum fields 0.06 0.20
Mines 0.30 0.63
Diamond mines 0.04 0.32
Size of area 2989.24 613.91
Electricity 0.44 0.44
Primary roads 1.88 1.66
Log population 12.86 1.39
Log infant mortality rate 2.11 0.43
Log cultivated 3.89 0.65
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index 0.61 0.29
Index of welfare and labour COVID-19 response 0.01 0.04
Male mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air 
pollution, age-standarised, year 2016 192.60 79.43
Number of observations 42010 3134 1330
Number of countries 24 24 24
1 January 2015-6 May2020 1 October-31 December 2019 After lockdown in 2020
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Table A.5. First-stage regression of Table 1, COVID-interventions and conflict  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
Male mortality rate attributed to household and 
ambient air pollution male -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Diabetes prevalence (% of population ages 20 to 
79) -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003***
(0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000)
Former colony (never colonised reference group):
British -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009***
(0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001)
French -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020***
(0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001)
Portuguese -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013***
(0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002)
German -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007***
(0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002)
Belgium -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012***
(0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001)
American Colonisation Society 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020***
(0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002)
IMF all commodity price -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Log index local market price 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001***
(0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000
(0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000)
% Mountains 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000
(0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001)
% Forests -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004***
(0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001)
Petroleum fields 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001
(0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001)
Mines 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001**
(0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000)
Diamond mines 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001**
(0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001)
Size of area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002***
(0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary roads 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001***
(0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000)
Log population -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000)
Log infant mortality rate -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015***
(0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001)
Log cultivated 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003***
(0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011***
(0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
R-squared 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113
Riots Violence against civilians Food-related incidents Food looting
  
39
Table A.6. First-stage regression of Table 2, COVID-interventions and fatalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fatalaties of:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
Male mortality rate attributed to household and 
ambient air pollution male -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Diabetes prevalence (% of population ages 20 to 
79) -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003***
(0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000)
Former colony (never colonised reference group):
British -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009***
(0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001)
French -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020***
(0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001)
Portuguese -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013***
(0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002)
German -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007***
(0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002)
Belgium -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012***
(0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001)
American Colonisation Society 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020***
(0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002)
IMF all commodity price -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Log index local market price 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001***
(0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000
(0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000)
% Mountains 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000
(0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001)
% Forests -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004***
(0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001)
Petroleum fields 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001
(0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001)
Mines 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001**
(0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000)
Diamond mines 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001**
(0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001)
Size of area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002***
(0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary roads 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001***
(0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000)
Log population -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000)
Log infant mortality rate -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015***
(0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001)
Log cultivated 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003***
(0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011***
(0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
R-squared 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113
Any ACLED conflict Riots Violence against civilians Food-related conflict
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Table A.7. First-stage regression of Table 3, COVID-interventions and the state 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
First social 
distancing 
Strict 
lockdown
Index 
welfare/
labour
Male mortality rate attributed to household and 
ambient air pollution male -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.120*** 0.000** -0.000***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Diabetes prevalence (% of population ages 20 to 
79) -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -3.189*** 0.005*** -0.003***
(0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000)
Former colony (never colonised reference group):
British -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009*** -43.649*** 0.037*** 0.009***
(0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001) (0.480) (0.006) (0.001)
French -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020*** -14.998*** 0.069*** 0.020***
(0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001) (0.476) (0.006) (0.001)
Portuguese -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -36.827*** 0.037*** 0.013***
(0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002) (0.892) (0.011) (0.002)
German -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007*** -45.109*** 0.063*** 0.007***
(0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002) (0.554) (0.007) (0.002)
Belgium -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012*** -16.255*** 0.049*** 0.012***
(0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001) (0.485) (0.006) (0.001)
American Colonisation Society 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020*** 12.062*** 0.023** 0.020***
(0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002) (0.876) (0.011) (0.002)
IMF all commodity price -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.006*** -0.001***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Log index local market price 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 1.497*** 0.017*** 0.001***
(0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000) (0.160) (0.002) (0.000)
Log stable nightlight (year 2015) 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000 4.162*** -0.011*** -0.000
(0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000) (0.139) (0.002) (0.000)
Log mobile phone coverage 2G-3G -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000 -2.230*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000)
% Mountains 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000 6.402*** 0.006* 0.000
(0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001) (0.294) (0.004) (0.001)
% Forests -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004*** -7.042*** -0.003 -0.004***
(0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001) (0.356) (0.004) (0.001)
Petroleum fields 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001 6.402*** -0.011** 0.001
(0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001) (0.361) (0.004) (0.001)
Mines 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001** 1.129*** 0.006*** 0.001**
(0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.000)
Diamond mines 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001** 2.604*** -0.001 0.001**
(0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002) (0.001)
Size of area -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Electricity -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002*** -3.413*** -0.002 -0.002***
(0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001) (0.202) (0.002) (0.001)
Primary roads 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 1.498*** -0.003*** -0.001***
(0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000)
Log population -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -2.710*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000)
Log infant mortality rate -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.279 0.012*** -0.015***
(0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001) (0.282) (0.003) (0.001)
Log cultivated 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003*** 3.223*** 0.004** 0.003***
(0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137) (0.002) (0.000)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011*** -19.392*** 0.036*** 0.011***
(0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001) (0.499) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010 42,010
R-squared 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113 0.817 0.186 0.113
State (military, policy, gard or government) 
involved as actor in: 
Any ACLED conflict Riots Violence against civilians Food-related conflict
